Universal Periodic Review
41st session - India

Joint Stakeholder Report

Human Rights Online in India

Submitting organisations

Access Now
Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF)
Access Now

an international non-profit organisation which works to defend and extend the
digital rights of users at risk globally. Through presence in 13 countries around
the world, Access Now provides thought leadership and policy recommendations
to the public and private sectors, and also operates a 24/7 digital security
helpline.

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Association for Progressive Communications (APC)

an organisation in consultative status with ECOSOC, advocates for the strategic
use of information and communications technologies to advance human rights.
The APC network has 62 organisational members and 29 individual Wmembers
active in 74 countries, including India.

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Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF)

a registered charitable trust which advocates to protect and advance constitutio
onal freedoms in a digital society. IFF works across a wide spectrum of issues,
with expertise in free speech, electronic surveillance, data protection, net
neutrality and innovation; IFF aims to champion privacy protections, digital
security, and individual freedoms in the digital age.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This joint stakeholder report focuses on key issues relating to human rights online in India, including internet shutdowns, digital exclusion, freedom of speech and expression online, online harassment and hate speech, privacy, surveillance and data protection. The report draws on extensive and ongoing monitoring of the situation of human rights online in India by a number of civil society organisations and a desk review.

2. This review marks the fourth cycle for India in the Universal Periodic Review mechanism. During the third cycle, India received nine recommendations relating to free speech, tackling religious discrimination, hate speech and xenophobia against minorities, protection of human rights defenders, privacy and communications surveillance. However, India failed to accept even a single one of these recommendations.1

3. Overall, India has accepted only 152 out of 250 recommendations made during the third cycle. In previous cycles, India had accepted 67 out of 169 recommendations (second cycle)2 and five out of 18 recommendations (first cycle).3

II. CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ONLINE IN INDIA

4. India has been going through an alarming digital authoritarian movement. Over the past few years, the government has taken a series of threatening intimidatory actions against human rights defenders and media personnel, and hastily created regulatory mechanisms that grant them problematic new powers and increased control over content on social media platforms that adversely impact human rights.

5. The government’s efforts to criminalise dissent and censor information include shutting down the internet, preventing journalists from entering protest sites, filing criminal charges against journalists who criticise the government, and issuing broad advisory directives to social media companies to block critical content. While certain regulatory measures were seemingly created to combat “fake news”, restrict illegal content and improve grievance redress mechanisms for users, they create a framework for unnecessary and disproportionate interference with freedom of expression by imposing onerous obligations on intermediaries to take down content, and an oversight mechanism that allows the government to determine what stays online.

6. There have been some positive efforts at the parliamentary level such as the report on the impact of internet shutdowns published by the Standing Committee on Information Technology and Communications.4 Even though the report falls short of condemning shutdowns altogether given their impact on fundamental rights, the report is significant

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as the first parliamentary publication documenting the impact of internet shutdowns on fundamental rights and must result in prompt and concrete actions by the government.

7. The redistribution of power that we are seeing in favour of the Government severely impacts fundamental rights to freedom of speech, expression, online association, and assembly; and this combined with the 2021 Pegasus project revelations (detailed in the Annex below) highlight the pattern of authoritarianism prevalent in India.

III. INTERNET SHUTDOWNS

8. In the year 2020, India imposed the highest number of internet shutdowns in the world. The past five years have seen an unprecedented increase in internet blockades or bandwidth throttling, as a weapon against dissent and protests, to curb freedom of speech and freedom of press, cover up human rights violations and also for administrative convenience. Often, they are imposed in an opaque and disproportionate manner, for reasons such as preventing cheating in exams (as done in Rajasthan and Arunachal Pradesh), and without making the order available in the public domain. This is in contravention of the Indian Supreme Court’s judgement in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, which requires that internet shutdown orders must be lawful, necessary and proportionate, and must also be published to enable those aggrieved to challenge the order before courts. Moreover, such orders can only be issued if it is absolutely necessary to do so. Subsequently, in Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that internet shutdown orders must be for a limited period.

9. Despite the aforementioned judgments, internet shutdown orders are far too common. To gauge the scale and severity of the impact of shutdowns, in Arunachal Pradesh the shutdown affected 15 out of the 25 administrative districts of the state. In Rajasthan, the largest state in India, a similar shutdown affected all administrative districts apart from one. In the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, India imposed the longest internet shutdown in a democracy, which has been condemned by UN human rights experts as a form of collective punishment of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, without even a pretext of a precipitating offence. Indian authorities continue to impose repeated shutdowns in Jammu and Kashmir.

10. The Union Government of India claims that it does not maintain a record of internet shutdowns implemented at the state level. Trackers maintained by civil society organisations, however, show a stark reality. The internet shutdowns tracker maintained

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7. 2020 SCC online SC 453
by Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC)\(^{14}\) has recorded 558 internet shutdowns since the year 2012.\(^{15}\)

11. In India, the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 is the applicable law which regulates imposition of internet shutdowns.\(^{16}\) Prior to the passage of the 2017 rules, state governments relied on section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to impose an internet shutdown.\(^{17}\)

12. The 2017 Rules have several shortcomings which have also been recognised by the Supreme Court of India. The rules do not provide in clear terms the conditions under which a shutdown can be imposed, which often leads to arbitrary shutdowns being imposed. Further, the rules do not provide an effective review mechanism (the review committee lacks independence as it comprises solely representatives of the executive). The legality of the 2017 Rules is being considered by Gauhati High Court in *Ajit Bhuyan v. State of Assam.*\(^{18}\)

13. These shutdowns not only restrict freedom of speech and expression but also have an immense impact on livelihood, education and health.\(^{19}\) During the pandemic, such shutdowns, especially the long-term shutdown in Kashmir, has resulted in loss of livelihood and education and increased hardships particularly for vulnerable sections of society.

### IV. DIGITAL EXCLUSION

14. The use of artificial intelligence-based systems in the country have resulted in both deliberate and unintended exclusions of sections of society from the implementation of these systems, particularly religious minorities and transgender communities.

15. For instance, a Document Segregation and Meta Data Entry (DOCSMEN) software was deployed\(^{20}\) to digitise legacy data development of 39 million applicants in the National Register of Citizenship (NRC) in Assam, with 1.9 million being excluded from the final list. The inclusion in the NRC list was based on a “legacy document” which required applicants to show connection to an ancestor who was included in an NRC done in 1951 or in the voter’s list of 1966. The legacy data documentation required the presentation of an enormous amount of data, and still the “family tree” algorithm which was used to verify a person’s legacy data excluded several in this process. Mild variations in spelling of names and addresses led to exclusion.\(^{21}\)

16. Further, persons registered in a D-voter list (the doubtful voters list) in the Assam NRC of 1951 and the “reference cases” registered by the border police at the time were excluded from the current NRC. In this process, if there were multiple people with the same names

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14. [https://sflc.in](https://sflc.in)

15. The organisation defines an internet shutdown as “a government-imposed disablement of access to the internet as a whole within a particular locality or localities for any duration of time.” [https://internetshutdowns.in](https://internetshutdowns.in)


18. PIL No. 79 of 2019.


20. [https://www.wipro.com/public-sector/digital-governance--achieving-citizen-enrolment-in-record-time0/#~text=Wipro%20partnered%20with%20the%20Government%2C%20100%25%20enrolment%20of%20Indian%20citizens%20in%20Assam%20has%20been%20trapping%20with%20the%20issue%20of%20undocumented%20immigration%20since%20independence](https://www.wipro.com/public-sector/digital-governance--achieving-citizen-enrolment-in-record-time0/#~text=Wipro%20partnered%20with%20the%20Government%2C%20100%25%20enrolment%20of%20Indian%20citizens%20in%20Assam%20has%20been%20trapping%20with%20the%20issue%20of%20undocumented%20immigration%20since%20independence)

and ancestral names and one of them happened to be in the reference case list or the D-voters list, all of them ended up getting excluded. The border police, deployed widely in Muslim-dominant districts, has the right to search and collect the fingerprints of any “doubtful” people.

17. In a similar way, trans people were excluded from the NRC list. Trans people often have a combination of either missing documents because they fled abusive homes when they were young, or documents that were inconsistent. Around 2000 trans people were excluded as a result of this, and a legal battle is ongoing.

18. Additionally, using AI to look into datasets the Aadhaar is linked to, and enforcing it to avail welfare benefits in a system where access itself is an issue, has led to several exclusions. For instance, the Telangana state government is actively using Samagra Vedika – an integrated platform comprising a 360-degree profile of every citizen in the state – to know if an applicant is truly eligible for a welfare scheme. However, news reports show that using the Samagra Vedika system, the government initiated mass cancellations of ration cards which enable access to food under the public distribution system. Some cancellations were due to the failure of the card holder to draw rations for six months, though such failure was caused by inability to use the ration card as their fingerprints were not getting detected by the machine.

V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH ONLINE

(i) Criminalisation of online speech

19. Legitimate expression on the internet is increasingly being criminalised through application of various laws in India. One of the most widely used laws in recent times for this purpose is the colonial era offence of sedition under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, punishable by imprisonment which can extend to life. In 1962, the Indian Supreme Court had laid down guidelines on how Section 124A should be applied, further clarifying that mere dissent will not amount to sedition.

20. Despite this, section 124A has continued to be used, contrary to the guidelines, to stifle legitimate opposition to the government through the years, and more recently, for various expression online. Since 2010, 102 cases have been filed under section 124A against 152 people for creating audios, photos or videos or for sharing content on social media across India, with a majority of the cases filed in the last four years.
supporting Pakistan against India in a cricket match,29 criticism of the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic,30 sharing a cartoon on India’s government and judiciary on Facebook,31 tweeting about the farmers’ protests32 and developing an online “toolkit” calling for peaceful protest against laws enacted by the government.33

21. The conviction rate for sedition cases has been extremely low, with under 4% of all cases filed resulting in a conviction;34 however, in many cases, despite tenuous allegations backed by little evidence, the process has become the punishment for those accused, who have been forced into a long, drawn-out legal process including incarceration and struggle for bail. In an ongoing petition seeking to strike down Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Chief Justice of India has noted the misuse of the section by state agencies and the lack of accountability for those responsible.35

22. Other laws have also been used to criminalise expression online, including sections of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).36 The UAPA, which was initially implemented to promote and ensure national integration, was later amended in 200437 and subsequently in 201938 to include provisions to counter terrorism and other unlawful activities. The UAPA gives the State the power to designate anyone as a “terrorist” with little evidence, and detain them for up to 180 days without filing a charge sheet. Concerns have been raised repeatedly on the use of the UAPA to stifle free speech and other civil liberties in the country. For instance, last year four Supreme Court lawyers and 102 other social media users were charged under the UAPA for social media posts on the violence against minorities in the state of Tripura.39 Similarly, charges under the UAPA were filed against various persons in Kashmir for ”misusing social media”.40 A petition challenging the constitutional validity of some sections of the UAPA is currently being heard in the Supreme Court of India.41

23. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (the IT Act), introduced by amendment in 2008, penalised sending “offensive messages” via online communication. The wide powers of the section were frequently used to stifle political dissent. In March

2015, the whole provision of section 66A was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India as it violated the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. However, studies have highlighted the continued use of section 66A, including cases registered after the Shreya Singhal decision.

In response to a petition filed by civil society organisations, in February 2019, the Supreme Court directed the Union of India to ensure compliance with its decision by making available copies of the judgement to Chief Secretaries across the country, and the sensitisation of police departments. However, findings on the “Zombie Tracker” platform indicated that as many as 810 cases under Section 66A are pending before the district courts in 11 states even post-2019. These findings have been used to approach the Supreme Court again, in response to which the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a notification in July 2021 directing all law enforcement authorities to stop registering new cases under Section 66A and to withdraw all pending cases immediately.

(ii) Censorship and website blocking

Legal provisions in India, including the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (the Intermediary Guidelines), the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (which establishes a Board that has the power to censor movies), and section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code (under which authorities can ban books) legalise the broad censorship of content by the Indian government, including on the internet.

The Intermediary Guidelines, which were brought in by way of an executive order issued in February 2021, give the Indian government new powers to force social media intermediaries, digital news platforms and over-the-top (OTT) platforms to comply with demands of censorship by the government. These rules promote self-censorship and stifle freedom of expression online. The government can also block access to online content if these guidelines are violated. United Nations independent experts have issued a joint statement highlighting various provisions in the guidelines which fail to meet the requirements of international human rights laws and standards related to the rights of privacy and freedom of speech and expression. The validity of the guidelines have been challenged before various High Courts in the country.

The Intermediary Guidelines establish two-tiered self-regulation mechanisms and an oversight body (an executive body); the multiple obligations created for online intermediaries will result in over-regulation of the digital space. Additionally, they mandate “significant social media intermediaries” to provide for traceability of senders of messages, which will require the service provider to create a backdoor in end-to-end encryption. Such a backdoor will result in breach of privacy and impact freedom of speech of users.

42. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523.
44. People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Others, MA 3220/2018 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 199/2013.
45. A platform built by the Internet Freedom Foundation in collaboration with Civic Data Labs. See: https://zombietracker.in
47. A timeline of book bans can be accessed at: https://sflc.in/read-me-not-list-banned-books-india and https://sflc.in/timeline-of-book-bans
28. The Intermediary Guidelines also cover regulation of content of the digital news platforms, despite the parent statute under which the guidelines were issued (the IT Act) not covering digital press within its scope. Further, the Central Government has introduced new Central Media Accreditation Guidelines, 2022. These guidelines, specifically clause 6.8 (which allows suspension or withdrawal of a journalist’s accreditation on a number of broad and vague grounds), restrict the freedom of press and cause a chilling effect on free speech.

29. Additionally, legal provisions such as Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act allow the central government and the various courts in the country to issue website-blocking orders that internet service providers (ISPs) are legally bound to comply with. Blocking directions issued are required to follow the due process as envisaged in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. However, the “confidentiality” clause contained in these rules, as well the broad grounds of “national security”, have been used by the government to deny right-to-information requests which seek to make public the website-blocking directions issued by the government. For example, information relating to the recent apps block incident was denied to SFLC and other civil society organisations.

30. The blocking of websites, social media accounts and applications is also on the rise. The information provided by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology to the Parliament shows a steady increase in the number of URLs blocked in recent years, from 471 URLs in 2014 to 9849 in 2020 and 6096 in 2021.

VI. ONLINE HARASSMENT AND HATE SPEECH

(i) Hate speech, threats and incitement towards religious minorities

31. Over the past few years, there has been a steady rise in hate and communal violence against persons belonging to minority religions in India. This has been propelled by state complicity and rampant hate speech in media, offline and online spaces, including by influential political actors, which is then amplified on social media and mass media.

32. In 2020, India experienced historic protests against the discriminatory Citizenship Amendment Act and the National Register of Citizens. In the aftermath of the implementation of the National Register of Citizens in the Indian state of Assam, Facebook and other social media was flooded with hate speech against Muslims, calling them “parasites” and “rats”, and calling for them to be exterminated. Similar hate speech against protestors was propagated on online platforms, especially those used by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology to the Parliament shows a steady increase in the number of URLs blocked in recent years, from 471 URLs in 2014 to 9849 in 2020 and 6096 in 2021.


belonging to the Muslim community, campaigning against the Citizenship Amendment Act,\textsuperscript{57} and against Sikh protestors during the farmers’ protests, with many of them being labelled Khalistani (Sikh separatists) and “terrorists”.\textsuperscript{58}

33. The situation for religious minorities also worsened with a steep rise in Islamophobic and other hate speech and misinformation against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, where political leaders\textsuperscript{59} took to social media to propagate misinformation and stigma against minorities.\textsuperscript{50} Terms like “Corona Jihad” and “Tablighi Virus” were repeatedly used across mainstream and social media to dehumanise and blame minorities for the spread of the virus, resulting in threats to their lives and social boycotts.\textsuperscript{61}

34. Further, despite social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp being key means through which such hate speech has been perpetuated, little has been done by the platforms to curb the problem. In fact, reports from the Wall Street Journal\textsuperscript{62} revealed that Facebook India’s top policy executive was involved in opposing and preventing the application of the platform’s hate speech rules to members of the governing party in India.

35. Hate speech has the effect of routinising discrimination and even physical violence, ultimately paving the way for communal disharmony and genocide. It is clear that the hate speech and incitement to violence propagated during the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and NRC protests laid the groundwork for the violence subsequently carried out against Muslim minorities in New Delhi.\textsuperscript{63}

36. There have also been harassment and threats against minorities through the targeting of women from different communities, particularly by depriving them of their agency to make decisions relating to their religion and faith. Right-wing Hindu groups have perpetuated propaganda using Facebook and WhatsApp around a movement called “Love Jihad”, where they claim that there is a concerted effort by Muslim men to convert women from their religion into Islam.\textsuperscript{64} More recently, the phone numbers and addresses of Muslim women students, who were protesting their right to wear hijab in educational institutions, were leaked online, resulting in them being doxxed and abused.\textsuperscript{65}

37. The Preamble of the Constitution of India explicitly recognises the secular nature of the State while Articles 25, 26 and 28 guarantee and limit freedom of religion and conscience. Sections 153-A, 153-B and 505 of the IPC, deal with hate speech, Section 295A penalises those who insult religion or religious freedoms and Section 298 deals with uttering words that may wound religious feelings. Besides these, a vast body of provisions is used to address hate speech in India.\textsuperscript{66} The Law Commission in India is currently preparing a law


\textsuperscript{61} Murthy, L. (2020). The Contagion of Hate in India. APC. https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/APC_Hate_Speech_V10_0.pdf


\textsuperscript{63} https://time.com/5794354/delhi-riots-muslims-india/


on hate speech. However, there has been very little action taken by authorities against those who have engaged in hate speech or incitement to violence against religious minorities. Instead, the broad scope of some of these laws have resulted in curbing legitimate expression of minorities in many instances.

(ii) Technology-facilitated gender-based violence, harassment and abuse

38. Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TGBV) includes actions that harm others based on their sexual or gender identity or by enforcing harmful gender norms. These actions are carried out using the internet and/or mobile technology and include stalking, bullying, sex-based harassment, defamation, hate speech, exploitation and gender trolling.

39. India has a high gender gap in mobile ownership – women are 46% less likely than men to own mobiles. Only 11% of women have internet access. The gender divide in terms of digital access only exacerbates the magnitude of online violence against girls, women and LGBTIQIA+ persons who are disproportionately affected by TGBV. A survey shows that 58% of girls and young women have faced online harassment or abuse. In a study by the International Center for Research on Women, over 85% of respondents who experienced TGBV reported fearing for their own safety; experiencing anxiety or depression; and reducing their online behaviours.

40. According to the National Commission for Women, online harassment cases saw a five-fold increase since the COVID outbreak – from 300 complaints of online harassment to 1,500 post-COVID. Increased TGBV during COVID has impacted survivors’ psychological, social and reproductive health, translated into offline physical and sexual violence, restricted their access to online services, and diminished participation from women with multiple identities due to targeted discrimination and hate speech.

41. Gender trolling, or targeted hate speech against women and gender minorities, has been used with increasing frequency against women journalists and activists who are politically vocal online. This ranges from sexist comments to rape and death threats and even the use of technological applications like Tek Fog to aid in these targeted campaigns. For instance, a study of Twitter mentions of 95 Indian female politicians shows that one in five

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tweets were sexist or misogynistic. Many of those targeted often exit online spaces or restrict their online visibility.76

42. Another prominent form of online violence is image-based abuse like non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII), the first conviction for which took place only in 2018.77 Among youth, cyberbullying is an increasing concern as India has one of the highest global rates at 53%.78 Lastly, a form of TGBV that is often unaccounted for are anonymous calls; one in three women who use mobiles in India face harassment or receive inappropriate calls.79

43. Several reports have also highlighted targeted harassment of Muslim female journalists and activists.80 In January 2022, hundreds of Muslim women were listed for “auction” on the “Bulli Bai” app – a clone of “Sulli Deals” which had also targeted Muslim women less than a year ago.81 An Amnesty International report also found that female Muslim politicians received 94.1% more ethnic or religious slurs than women of other religions.82

44. While the digital space has been a forum for self-expression, it has also been a platform for queerphobic abuse like the online harassment of a trans rights activist who started an online fundraiser83 or the case of a popular YouTuber who used homophobic and casteist slurs in his video.84

45. Existing legislation on sexual violence, harassment, criminal intimidation and other forms of online violence are inadequate and often women and gender minorities are hesitant to engage in this lengthy process.85 While there are some sections in the IPC and the IT Act that the police and judiciary use to address the different forms of online abuse, they are often ad hoc or disconnected. Moreover, they are either focused on offline gender-based violence or on online fraud and are not framed within the context of gender and violation of integrity and personal autonomy.

46. Presently, the Union government and state governments are empowered to conduct surveillance under section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (Telegraph Act)86 and section 69 of the IT Act.87 Under rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules, 195188 which governs the process under section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, the authorised officer is permitted to direct interception of messages only “on the occurrence of public emergency” or “if it is in
the interest of public safety.” Under section 69 of the IT Act and rules prescribed thereunder,\(^{89}\) the authorised officer may issue directions for interception if it is in interest of the grounds stated therein which are similar to those listed under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act. In addition to these provisions, a Standard Operating Procedure was issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs.\(^{90}\)

### VII. PRIVACY, SURVEILLANCE AND DATA PROTECTION

#### (i) Usage of mass and targeted surveillance, spyware and hacking

47. However, this surveillance framework suffers from multiple drawbacks. Firstly, the existing surveillance framework does not provide opportunity for either judicial or parliamentary review or oversight and is effectuated entirely by the executive. In the absence of such oversight, this framework violates the proportionality standard espoused in the Supreme Court’s decision in *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*\(^{91}\) as proportionality requires the executive to provide sufficient procedural safeguards. It also violates existing principles of “separation of powers” by concentrating all surveillance authority with the executive, and “due process of law”, as there is no effective remedy against surveillance, which by its very nature is carried out in secret.\(^{92}\) Secondly, with the advancement of technology, targeted surveillance is now being conducted through extremely sophisticated software and hardware, use of which has not been regulated by any existing Indian law. Methods of targeted surveillance have been increasingly used by the Indian government to target journalists, politicians and human rights defenders in India, including through the use of Pegasus spyware. Details of instances of such surveillance are provided in the Annex to this report.

48. The existing legal provisions regarding surveillance only relate to targeted interception of calls and messages or data. However, mass surveillance, i.e. indiscriminate surveillance of entire populations or categories of individuals, is increasing through government actions in the absence of any legislation to regulate it. Such surveillance is not permissible as it is not prescribed by law. However, massive amounts of personal data is being collected, processed and shared further by police and security or intelligence agencies that operate in the absence of any legislative basis or effective oversight. These actions violate several rights under the Constitution including the rights to life and liberty, privacy and freedom of movement. They also have the potential to have a chilling effect on the rights to freedom of speech and expression and peaceful assembly and protest.

49. Details of instances of mass surveillance which are being undertaken in India are detailed in the Annex, including the use of the National Automated Facial Recognition System, the National Intelligence Grid (an integrated IT solution which would allow user agencies to access data gathered from various databases) and the Centralised Monitoring System (an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social media engagement and phone calls).

#### (ii) Data protection

50. In the absence of a data protection law in India, people’s data and right to privacy have been vulnerable to continuing exploitation by the private and public sectors, without recourse to remedy, against the backdrop of growing surveillance impunity.

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89. The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.
92. [https://internetfreedom.in/bulk-cdr-mass-surveillance](https://internetfreedom.in/bulk-cdr-mass-surveillance)
51. Despite the lack of an effective data protection regime that safeguards people's rights, the government has been accelerating proposals for projects entailing massive exercises of collection and retention of personal information, including for example, a digital health ID, a model of “federated digital identities”, and linking of Aadhar (India’s biometric ID system) with voter IDs. This is contrary to the underlying purpose of the imminent personal data protection framework, and severely undermines people's right to privacy and freedom of choice with respect to their data.

52. The current draft of the Personal Data Protection Bill in India, with recommendations in the Joint Parliamentary Committee report, fails to adequately uphold international standards and best practices, human rights principles and safeguards aligned with the rulings of the Indian Supreme Court on the right to privacy.

53. The draft data protection law also deviates from the positive recommendations and privacy protections envisaged in the report of the Justice Srikrishna Committee that spearheaded the process of devising a personal data protection framework for India in 2018.

54. At present, India has a draft data protection law that jeopardises privacy, and fails to:

(a) create a data protection authority with complete independence from the government;
(b) initiate surveillance reform, impose restrictions and establish an independent oversight mechanism to ensure accountability and transparency;
(c) impose meaningful limitations and safeguards, in line with principles of necessity and proportionality, on the government’s extensive powers to access and control data; and
(d) engender a data protection regime that empowers people to exercise and enforce their fundamental rights. The bill must be amended, in consultation with all stakeholders, including civil society, before it can be implemented as a rights-respecting law.

55. Data protection requirements around purpose limitation, free, explicit, prior and informed consent for data processing, data minimisation, and integrity and confidentiality of data are even more critical for people who face lateral surveillance and for whom the exploitation of their data can have more severe implications for their rights to privacy, security and other fundamental rights. For instance, the risk of processing of personal data for individual profiling leading to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics is only growing as digital identity programmes are becoming mandatory in many parts of the world.

56. Further, this crucial legislative vacuum exacerbates the damage caused by data breaches owing to lack of recourse for those affected. In 2021, India ranked third in the world in terms of the number of data breaches, with a total of 86.63 million Indian users' data breached till

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95. https://rethinkaadhaar.in/blog/voteridaadhaarlinkage
November 2021.\textsuperscript{102} There is insufficient investigation and prosecution of such data breaches, and a lack of any meaningful effort from the executive to ensure that individuals have avenues to seek remedy and redress for violation of their rights.

57. Going against the decisions of the Supreme Court in \textit{NALSA v Union of India}\textsuperscript{103} and \textit{Puttaswamy v. Union of India}\textsuperscript{104} (which recognised right to privacy as a fundamental right), the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019\textsuperscript{105} continues to medicalise transgender persons by demanding a medical certificate from individuals who wish to identify within the binary genders of male and female. This limits the ability of every individual to exercise their bodily autonomy in changing their name and gender on identification documents, enter data systems and access any of their rights. Furthermore, this also affects the privacy of transgender persons. The medical process has been challenged in the legal petition against the new law.\textsuperscript{106}

58. The access to any state-sanctioned welfare programme, public sector or private sector services all require transgender individuals to become a part of different data systems using a government-issued identification document in a person’s preferred name and self-identified gender as transgender. Unless an individual discloses their transgender identity, they cannot access exclusive programmes for transgender persons.\textsuperscript{107} Individuals are required to repeatedly reveal and provide their identity; and are constantly expected to choose between their right to life – public healthcare, welfare schemes and their right to privacy.

59. With policies still underway for inclusion of transgender persons, existing digital systems and the digital processes to access them continue to remain inaccessible to transgender persons in terms of gender category, technical understanding, usability, language and interface, among others.\textsuperscript{108}

\section*{VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS}

60. We recommend that the Government of India take the following measures to uphold human rights online in India:

\textbf{Internet shutdowns}

- Refrain from intentionally slowing, blocking, or shutting down internet and telecommunications services, websites or applications and ensure that due processes established by law and court judgments are strictly followed, with a robust mechanism for redress and remedy.
- Publish internet shutdown orders.
- Maintain a database of internet shutdown orders issued across the country.
- Conduct a study to examine the effectiveness of internet shutdown orders in dealing with law-and-order situations.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} (2014) 5 SCC 438.
\textsuperscript{104} (2017) 10 SCC 1.
\textsuperscript{105} Transgender persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. \url{https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/13091?sam_han-dle=123456789/1362}
• Amend the 2017 Rules and provide for a review committee which consists of former judges of the High Court or the Supreme Court, and empower the committee to set aside internet shutdown orders.

Digital exclusion

• Implement comprehensive social auditing and policy analysis of the different artificial intelligence (AI) frameworks; and ensure that when such AI systems are used, that redressal mechanisms are put in place that do not put the burden on the welfare beneficiaries.

Freedom of speech online

• Repeal or amend laws and regulations, including Section 124A of the IPC and the UAPA, 1967, which restrict freedom of expression and bring them in line with international human rights law.
• Withdraw all cases against individuals facing harassment, intimidation and prosecution from state authorities for legitimate expression and dissent against the government.

Technology-facilitated gender-based violence and hate speech

• Amend laws addressing hate speech that constitute incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence, to bring them in line with international human rights standards and ensure that they are not misused to undermine freedom of expression of minorities, while holding accountable those engaging in incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence against minorities.
• Develop appropriate mechanisms of accountability for social media platforms and other technology companies to ensure that hate speech and gender-based violence is regulated on their platforms, there is appropriate response to such instances and safeguards and redressal mechanisms are available for those affected.
• Review and strengthen policies, legal and regulatory frameworks to address gender-based violence in digital contexts.

Privacy, surveillance and data protection

• Adopt an intersectional approach to protecting the right to privacy, which recognises the specific experiences and threats to privacy experienced by women and LGBTIQA+ persons; and amend the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 to ensure the right to privacy of trans persons.
• Pass a comprehensive law on informational privacy and surveillance, which strongly regulates state-sponsored surveillance and imposes limitations in line with necessity and proportionality on access to data and interception of communications, under judicial control and independent oversight, and with other protections to safeguard citizens.
• Implement a data protection framework that establishes a data protection authority with complete independence from the executive, creates meaningful checks against the government’s powers to access data, and clear and enforceable rights for individuals with respect to the collection and use of their data.
Recent cases of surveillance and spyware harms

(i) Use of Pegasus spyware to target journalists, politicians and human rights defenders in India: In July 2021, The Wire,¹ as part of an international collaborative investigation titled “Pegasus Project”, revealed that numerous journalists, politicians and human rights defenders in India were targeted through the use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware. Once Pegasus has been installed in the mobile device, it can harvest SMS messages, address books, call history, calendars, emails and internet browsing histories, as well as gain access to and extract any files on the device. No such power to hack the phones of Indian citizens exists under Indian law, and the pre-existing surveillance powers available under the Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Information Technology Act, 2000 do not permit the installation of spyware or the hacking of mobile devices. Hacking of computer resources, including mobile phones and apps, is in fact a criminal offence under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

(ii) Use of NetWire against the accused in the Bhima Koregaon case: Reports² by digital forensics consulting company Arsenal Consulting reveal that a commercially available malware named NetWire was used to surveil and plant evidence on the computers of two of the accused in the Bhima Koregaon case. The reports relate specifically to two of the accused, Rona Wilson (Reports ¹³ and ²⁴) and Surendra Gadling (Report ³⁵). According to the reports, Rona Wilson’s and Surendra Gadling’s computers were compromised for 22 and 20 months, respectively. The primary goals of the attacker were surveillance and incriminating document delivery. In their report, Arsenal indicated this is one of the most serious cases of evidence tampering they have ever encountered, based on various metrics including the vast timespan between the delivery of the first and last incriminating documents on multiple defendants’ computers.

(iii) Indian hack-for-hire firm Belltrox banned from Facebook for surveillance activities: On 16 December 2021 Meta, the parent company of Facebook, issued a press release titled “Taking action against the surveillance-for-hire industry.”⁶ This press release was on the basis of and accompanied by a threat report titled “Threat Report on the Surveillance-for-Hire Industry”.⁷ At the end of a months-long investigation, seven entities were identified as engaging in surveillance-for-hire activities and subsequently removed from Meta’s platforms. One of the entities identified was the Delhi-based M/s Belltrox Infotech Services Private Limited (Belltrox). According to the threat report, Meta has removed about 400 Facebook accounts linked to Belltrox, the vast majority of which were inactive for years. Belltrox was engaged in reconnaissance of, engagement with and exploitation of targets. Previously, The Citizen Lab⁸ and Reuters⁹ had also disclosed the information about Belltrox’s hacking

² Arsenal Consulting. (2021, 18 December). BK Case.
activities. The techniques adopted by them included phishing attacks and impersonation, which they used to either hack into devices to get access to private data, or to deceive people into sharing their private data.

Recent cases of mass surveillance

(i) The national Automated Facial Recognition System\(^{10}\) (AFRS) aims to develop and use a national database of photographs to be used in conjunction with a facial recognition technology (FRT) system by central and state security agencies. However, use of FRT has been increasing steadily in the past few years, especially by state police departments such as, among others, the Delhi Police,\(^{11}\) the Hyderabad Police,\(^{12}\) the Punjab Police,\(^{13}\) the Bengaluru Police,\(^{14}\) the Maharashtra Police\(^{15}\) and the Tamil Nadu Police.\(^{16}\) Claims relating to the accuracy of FRT systems are routinely exaggerated and the real numbers leave much to be desired. The implementation of such faulty FRT systems would lead to high rates of false positives, resulting in misidentification, and false negatives, resulting in exclusion, in this recognition process. While there have been claims of a fully accurate FRT system, none of these claims have been corroborated by independent review and audit. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has extensively tested FRT systems for 1:1 verification and 1:many identification, and for how accuracy of these systems vary across demographic groups.\(^{17}\)

These independent studies have concluded that currently no FRT system has 100% accuracy. An accurate FRT system would hypothetically have a 100% success rate in 1:1 verification and/or 1:many identification. However, it will come with its own ominous connotations, the most problematic of which may be state-led mass surveillance and difficulty for outside actors to challenge government decisions. Mass surveillance is also effectuated through the use of CCTV cameras, sometimes in conjunction with FRT, by state police departments to surveil the entire population of specific cities. Recently, the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi boasted about New Delhi being the most surveilled city in the world with 1,826.6 cameras per square mile.\(^{18}\) However, multiple studies through the years have proven that CCTV surveillance has little to no effect on reduction of crime in the surveilled area.\(^{19}\)

(ii) The National Intelligence Grid\(^{20}\) (NATGRID) is an integrated IT solution which would allow user agencies to access data gathered from various databases such as credit and debit cards, tax, telecom, immigration, airlines and railway tickets, passports and driving licences, among others. The Right to Information Act (RTA), 2000, which aims to bring transparency and accountability to government authorities, contains a provision which exempts intelligence agencies from its purview under S.24(2) of the act.\(^{21}\) NATGRID is

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exempted from the RTI Act, 2005. In addition to being exempt from the RTI Act, NATGRID is also being developed and deployed in the absence of a data protection law in India. Since NATGRID aims to collate data from various sources to create profiles of people to track for criminal activity, it is necessary that data protection measures be put in place to ensure that NATGRID does not violate its mandate by function creep. “Function creep” occurs when information is used for a purpose that is not the original specified purpose. In the absence of data protection measures and by being exempt from disclosures under the RTI Act, NATGRID presents the very obvious danger of becoming a tool for state-sponsored mass surveillance.

(iii) The Centralised Monitoring System (CMS) is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social media engagement and phone calls on landlines and cell phones, among other communications. In the absence of a data protection law in India and without any intermediaries in place, the process through which interception would be done under the CMS lacks transparency. This means that the general public will not know if and when a person’s data has been intercepted. It would also be difficult to ascertain whether there was a valid reason for the interception. A practice of mass surveillance could be adopted wherein large groups of people have their data intercepted without a valid reason. Since these interception authorisations will be done by government agencies internally, there will be no way of knowing about them and whether they were done for a valid reason, let alone questioning or challenging them. Further, right to information (RTI) applications filed by the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) reveal that the Department of Telecommunications has sought bulk call data records from telecom operators.

(iv) The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) aims to connect police stations across the country to increase ease of access to data related to First Information Report registration, investigation and charge sheets in all police stations. CCTNS is being implemented in the country without a data protection law in place. This leads to privacy concerns because the CCTNS is proposed to be integrated with various projects such as NATGRID and AFRS. Integration of the CCTNS with these projects would thus allow the state to create complete profiles of citizens.

22. Department of Personnel and Training, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, section-3 sub-section (i) (Notification, 9 June 2011).
24. https://internetfreedom.in/bulk-cdr-mass-surveillance